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ABSTRACT 
In 2004 one of the biggest ferry operators in Norway was found guilty of having intentionally 
attempted to defraud the state of about NOK 113 million in subsidies by underreporting 
revenues and overstating costs during the period 1992-2002. The company and five of the 
top managers were convicted and the case was regarded as one of the most serious subsidy 
offences ever committed in Norway. The aim of this article is to show that standardized 
revenue– and cost norms models from the state can deter operators from committing such 
offences and when relevant detect the fraud attempts at an early stage. Our model suggests 
that the operator in question overstated costs by about 19 per cent and that the actual 
subsidy fraud attempt was about three times higher than concluded by the Court.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In Norway, as in many other countries, the public transport authorities’ pecuniary 
compensation to the operators for running scheduled transport on non-profit routes is based 
on expected total operating costs (gross contracts) and expected subsidy needs (net 
contracts). The subsidies given to each operator are determined either through negotiations 
or competitive tendering. According to Bekken et al. (2006) net contracts constituted 90 per 
cent of all bus services procured on a negotiated basis in Norway in 2005 whilst tendering 
usually implies gross contracts. Even though competitive tendering has gradually become 
more popular for the provision of transport services in Norway (Mathisen and Solvoll, 2008), 
negotiations still play a major role. The negotiations between the operators and the 
authorities are partly based on every operator’s reported revenues and costs, and partly on 
standardized revenue- and cost models (SRC-models) developed by the authorities. As far 
as the local bus and fast craft services are concerned, net contracts have been used and the 
operators have received their subsidies from the county councils. To our knowledge neither 
county has developed SRC-models for fast craft transport, but such models became 
increasingly more important for bus transport during the 1980’s.3 In 1991, for example, 10 of 
the 19 county authorities in Norway actively used SRC-models during negotiation processes 
with bus operators (Jørgensen et al., 1995).  
 
Net contracts have been used in the Norwegian ferry industry since 1990, but, in contrast to 
bus and fast craft operations, the majority of ferry operators receive their subsidies from the 
Directorate of Roads (DR). DR does not use SRC-models at all when negotiating with a ferry 
operator, but instead uses the operators’ reported accounting figures as basis for the 
negotiations. This means that DR (the regulator) possesses far less knowledge than the ferry 
operators (agents) about how different factors influence subsidy needs. Due to this 
asymmetric information, DR probably stands out as the weak part in the negotiation process, 
because a fair distribution of subsidies presupposes honest operators.  
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The direct relationship between the subsidy level on the one hand and reported operating 
costs and revenue on the other hand, encourages the operators to overstate costs and to 
understate revenues with the aim of increasing the subsidy grant. The less the operators 
perceive that DR knows about their true costs and revenues, the less they perceive the 
probability of being detected if giving incorrect information and, consequently, the more 
tempting they find it to swindle DR. When the ferry operators, on the other hand, know that 
the authorities possess accurate knowledge about the industry’s revenue- and cost structure 
through SRC-models, they are less likely to report inaccurate values because they perceive 
the probability of detection as being high. Consequently, the use of SRC-models does have a 
deterrent effect. 4 It is also worth noting that SRC-models are useful for the authorities under 
a tendering regime; the models enable them to weed out unrealistic tenders and thus reduce 
the problem of the “winners curse”. The models will, thus, encourage transport operators to 
submit thoroughly prepared tenders. 
 
Even though many ferry services in Norway have been replaced with bridges and tunnels in 
the last two decades, the ferries still play an important function in the transport infrastructure 
in coastal areas. In 2007, there were 130 ferry services in Norway operated by 18 shipping 
companies which have in total about 180 ferries at their disposal. These ferries carried the 
same year nearly 20 million vehicles and over 21 million passengers (excluding car drivers). 
74 of the 130 ferry services are connecting islands to the mainland whilst 56 are crossing 
fjords. About 20 per cent of the services imply that the ferries have to pass unsheltered 
stretches of open sea. The costs of operating the ferry services were in 2004 about 2900 
Norwegian kroner (NOK) 5 and the revenue from passengers and vehicles was about 1300 
million NOK. This resulted in subsidy requirement of 1600 million NOK (Jørgensen et al., 
2005). For a more thorough review of the cost structure of the Norwegian ferries, we refer to 
Jørgensen et al. (2004) and Mathisen (2008).  
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The importance of the ferry sector in the Norwegian transport system combined with high 
subsidy transfers to the sector, resulted in great media publicity when it was disclosed in 
November 2002 that one of the largest ferry companies in Norway, Ofoten og Vesteraalens 
Dampskibsselskab ASA (OVDS), had intentionally manipulated its accounting figures and in 
this way defrauded DR of several million NOK during the period 1994-2002. The aim of this 
article is to use the OVDS case to demonstrate how the use of simple SRC-models could 
have disclosed significant deviations from expected revenues and costs so that the subsidy 
fraud could have been revealed and hindered.  
 
The structure of the article is as follows. In section 2 we briefly review the OVDS-case. 
Section 3 presents our data sources and develops simple revenue- and cost models to 
illustrate how use of them could have revealed the fraud. In section 4 we briefly compare our 
results with the court’s verdict. Finally, in section 5 we offer some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. THE OVDS CASE AND TRIAL 
In July 2002 a former managing director in OVDS hinted to DR that he and other top 
managers in OVDS had swindled them for years by manipulating the company’s accounting 
figures. In practice, the company operated with two sets of accounts, making it difficult to 
reveal the fraud both for the auditor and the transport authorities. This resulted in DR in 
November 2002 made a formal complaint to the Norwegian National Authority for 
Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (ØKOKRIM) putting the 
case that OVDS had manipulated its accounting figures for over a decade. ØKOKRIM 
continued the investigation and decided to charge OVDS for subsidy fraud. The offence was 
soon characterized as the worse subsidy fraud ever committed in Norway, and the case 
received, as mentioned earlier, extensive media publicity. For a more thorough description of 
the verdict, we refer to Salten District Court (2004).  
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When the Court passed judgement in August 2004, the company was found guilty of having 
reported too low revenues and too high costs, in total amounting to 8.6 million NOK and 
104.4 million NOK, respectively, during the period 1992-2001. The company, thus, had the 
intention of defrauding DR for subsidies amounting to about 113 million NOK (139 million 
NOK in 2006 prices) in which overstatement of costs amounted to approximately 92 per cent. 
Measured in 2006 prices, the Court found the overestimation of subsidy needs to vary from 
about 7.7 million NOK in 1998 to about 21 million NOK in 1995. In comparison, OVDS’s total 
yearly costs and ticket revenues of running all its ferry services amounted to about 200 
million NOK and 90 million NOK, respectively, in 2006 prices. The Court estimated the 
amount of swindle attempts for every year by comparing the reported revenue, cost and 
traffic figures to DR for year t with the company’s public financial statement for year t. The 
latter figures are approved by an external auditor.  
 
One important question which the Court needed to address was to what extent the incorrect 
reported accounting figures had influenced the negotiations, and thereby the subsidy given to 
OVDS. The counsel of the defence for the ferry company put forward the argument that if the 
incorrect reported figures did have a great impact on the negotiation results, DR must have 
had poor management control systems - since they were not able to reveal and hinder the 
fraud at an earlier stage. In fact, if a former top director had not informed of the fraud, it is 
uncertain whether the offence would ever have been discovered. The defenders continued 
the company’s defence by arguing that clearly, the absence of use of SRC-norms and/or 
incomplete such norms, did not enable DR to check for and react on significant deviations in 
reported revenue- and cost figures. Consequently, the more influence OVDS’s manipulated 
accounting figures had on the outcome of the negotiations, the poorer was DR’s control 
system. DR could, thus, not at the same time argue that the misreported figures had a great 
impact on the subsidy given, and that they did indeed have a proper management control 
system. 
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The Court finally decided that yearly increase in subsidies given to OVDS due to incorrect 
reported accountant figures amounted to about 70 per cent of the overstated subsidy needs.6 
The judgement cost OVDS in total about 72 million NOK, of which 6.3 million NOK were fine 
and legal costs and 65.7 million NOK was compensation to the state. All five members of the 
top management were indicted for having participated in the fraud. They admitted that their 
actions had led to incorrect reported revenue- and cost figures, but only two of them said that 
they had done this intentionally. Despite this, all were found guilty of subsidy fraud and 
imprisoned for periods ranging from 9 months to 42 months, with the unconditional 
imprisonment period varying from 3 months to 16 months.  
 
The enforcement authorities preferred, thus, to penalize both the company (shareholders) 
and the top managers. To our knowledge, this was the first time in Norway that members of a 
company’s top management have been imprisoned, even though the court could not prove 
that they had directly benefited personally. The verdict was therefore of great interest among 
the lawyers, in that it might offer precedence for similar cases in the future. Whether the 
enforcement authorities’ best strategy is to penalize the company rather than the employees 
in order to prevent corporate crime is an important issue in the theoretical literature on the 
economics of crime, see for example Alexander (2004).  
 
   
3. THE REVENUE- AND COST MODELS 
 
3.1 The Revenue Models 
Let the annual fare revenues obtained from passenger and vehicle transport from ferry 
service i (Rip and Riv respectively) be specified by the following linear functions:  
 
(1)   iipiipippip qDaXPaPaaR  132210 )( , ),,1( N...i   and   
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(2)   iiviivivviv uDaXXaXaaR  13212110 )(    
 
in which N is the number of services. Xi1 and Pi represents the number of passenger car 
equivalents (PCE) and the number of passengers transported over service i, respectively. 
PCE is a compound measure using one passenger car shorter than 6 meters as numeraire.7 
Xi2 is the length of service i. Consequently, (Xi1Xi2) and (PiXi2) denote the number of PCE-km 
and passenger-km travelling on service i, respectively. Di1 describes whether service i is run 
by OVDS (Di1 = 1) or not (Di1 = 0). Finally qi and ui are random error terms which are 
assumed to have traditional properties; expected value of zero and normally and 
independently distributed.  
 
According to the Norwegian ferry fare system for passengers and cars decided by DR and 
described in Jørgensen et al. (2004), fares are strictly regulated according to a nationwide 
scheme and cross-subsidy between services or vehicle categories is not allowed. It is, thus, 
reasonable to assume a positive linear relationship between revenues on the one hand and 
the above production measures on the other hand where a0p, a0v ≈ 0 and a1p, a2p, a1v, a2v > 0. 
Even though the fare schemes imply a close relationship between revenues and the 
productions measures in (1) and (2), there are some stochastic effects arising from 
inaccurate revenue reports from the ferry companies and from the fact that the proportion of 
discounted fares may vary across ferry services. Moreover, according to the court’s 
conclusions, OVDS understated revenues during the period 1992-2001 except for the years 
1996, 1999 and 2000. This indicates that a3p = a3v = 0 for these three years and (a3p+ a3v) < 0 
for the other years.8 After the point in time that OVDS became suspected of subsidy fraud, it 
is reasonable to assume that the company stopped committing such offences implying that 
a3p = a3v = 0 after 2002. 
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3.2 The cost model 
In accordance with Jørgensen et al. (2004), we assume that the cost structure of the ferry 
industry can be specified by the following modified translog cost function:9  
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in which N represents the number of services and Ci represents the annual total costs 
reported from the ferry operators to DR for running service i. Since our estimation of the cost 
function is based on the ferry companies’ reported costs, we also introduce the dummy 
variable Di1 in the model in order to take into account whether the costs data relates to OVDS 
(Di1 = 1) or not (Di1 = 0). Because all services are operated on contracts given by DR 
according to the ferry standard, there is no reason to believe that other factors such as 
differences in quality or safety should distinguish the ferry companies. Also, there are no 
indications that costs of input factors such as salary and fuel are unevenly distributed 
throughout the country. Di2 is a dummy variable where Di2 = 0 if the service i is located in 
sheltered waters, whereas Di2 = 1 if the service runs in unsheltered stretches of open sea. µ1 
and µ2 are the averages of the natural logarithms of PCE-units and PCE-km, respectively, 
and are defined as follows:  
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Finally vi is a random error term assumed to possess the same standard properties as qi and 
ui in (1) and (2).  
 
It is worth noting that 100b5 and 100b6 denote the percentage changes in costs when Di1 and 
Di2 increase from 0 to 1, respectively, see for example Sydsæter and Hammond (1995). If the 
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authorities’ accusations made against OVDS were correct, b5 > 0 before 2002, whereas b5 ≈ 
0 after the fraud was detected, providing that OVDS operates approximately as effectively as 
the other ferry companies. Since technical and safety demands for ferries operating in 
unsheltered stretches of open sea are considerably higher than for those only sailing in 
sheltered waters, it is reasonable to assume that b6 > 0.   
 
Furthermore, it can be deduced from (3) that if the marginal costs for the ferry operators of 
carrying one PCE are positive and increase with trip length ( 1/ ii XC  , 0/ 212  iii XXC ), it 
follows that b2, (b1 + b2) > 0. It remains, however, difficult to produce unambiguous 
statements regarding the signs of b0, b1, b3 and b4, see Jørgensen et al. (2004) for a more 
thorough discussion.  
 
3.3 Data sources 
Our analysis is based on reported accounting and output data from ferry services operated 
by 21 ferry companies from 1996 to 2000, and from 2003 to 2005. The data set, thus, 
includes observations for 5 years before and for three years after OVDS’s fraud was 
disclosed.10 Except for one service in which two of the ports of call are situated near each 
other and far away from the third port, we have omitted the services with more than two ports 
of call. The reason for doing this is that the reported value of average trip length per PCE 
(Xi2) is rather inaccurate for such services. Moreover, we have omitted services in year t 
which were discontinued during year t. This implies that our data set contains about half of 
the total number of ferry services in Norway. 
 
(Insert Table 1 about here)  
 
Table 1 shows that the yearly number of services included in the data set has fallen from 67 
in 1996 to 51 in 2005. This is mainly caused by a reduction in the number of ferry services in 
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Norway during this period. Revenues from passenger transport stand for about 28 per cent of 
total revenues. The average length of the ferry services has remained fairly constant at about 
8 km during the 9 year period. During the same time period the average values of costs and 
PCE have increased steadily, indicating greater transport activity on the services over time. It 
is also worth noting that OVDS runs 12 ferry services in total and that the data set contains 
the same 6 OVDS services for all years. The proportion of OVDS services varies, thus, from 
9 per cent in 1996 to 12 per cent in 2005. Furthermore, Table 1 shows that the proportion of 
services whose ferries operate in unsheltered stretches of open sea varies from 18 per cent 
to 23 per cent. 
 
3.4 Estimation results 
3.4.1 The revenue models 
Estimating the linear revenues models (1) and (2) using OLS produced residual plots and 
standard tests which did not meet the desired standard properties fully; their expected values 
are zero but some heteroskedasticity does occur. Trying standard remedies to moderate this 
problem by deflating the equations by one of the explanatory variables (see for example 
Maddala (1992)) did not help much. Despite this, F-values and adjusted R2 values above 400 
and 0.95 respectively for all years indicate that the models do capture well the variations in 
revenues from passenger and vehicle transport among the ferry services, see Table 2 and 
Table 3. A further examination of the results shows that a0p and a0v are not different from 
zero at a 10 per cent significance level, whilst a1p, a2p, a1v and a2v are all highly significantly 
positive for all years. The findings do thus support our a priori assumptions.  
 
As far as the OVDS verdict is concerned, the estimated values of a3p and a3v are not 
significantly different from zero for any years. More importantly, neither a3p nor a3v are 
significantly negative in 1997 and 1998; that is for the two years in our data set for which 
OVDS was accused for revenue underreporting. This means that our results do not indicate 
that OVDS has understated revenues during the period in question on the six services in our 
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data set. Since the Court did not take into consideration whether OVDS underreported 
revenues to a larger extent on some services than others, one reasonable conclusion is, 
then, that our estimations are in accordance with the Court’s conclusions for the years 1996, 
1999 and 2000, but in conflict with the verdict for the years 1997 and 1998. It is, however, 
worth noting that according to the accusation brought against OVDS, the magnitudes of the 
revenue manipulation were small; they stand for only 4.6 per cent of the overstating of 
subsidy needs for these two years.  
 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
Besides the standard properties with error terms not being fully met, let us finally mention 
another possible weakness with our revenue model: We have not accounted for the 
proportion of discounted fares on different services. This proportion is likely to vary 
significantly between ferry services, being highest on services with many regular travellers. If, 
for example, OVDS has a relatively high proportion of full fare payers, this pulls in the 
direction of high revenues in OVDS. This implies that our model can underestimate OVDS’s 
true revenues, and thus is unable to reveal understated revenues. One important fact making 
the occurring of this reasoning less likely is, however, that the estimated values of a3p and a3v 
are not significantly positive for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005; that is after OVDS’s fraud 
was detected. If OVDS reported correct revenues after incurring suspicion and had a higher 
proportion of full fare payers on their services than other operators, a3p and/or a3v should 
have been significantly positive for these years.  
 
(Insert Table 3 about here)  
 
3.4.2 The cost model 
Estimating the translog cost function in (3) using OLS showed that b3 did not significantly 
deviate from zero for any year. We therefore removed the squared explanatory variable 
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accompanying b3 and re-estimated the model without this variable. A thorough analysis of 
the residuals, u1…uN, shows that they have the desired statistical properties. This, in 
combination with the high values of F and adjusted R2 shown in Table 4, indicates that the 
model has a good fit and is well suited to explain the variations in costs amongst ferry 
services. The model coefficients are positive and generally significant. It is worth noting that 
our presumptions that b2, (b1+b2) > 0 are verified at a 1 per cent significance level for all 
years. Also the coefficient related to the types of waters in which ferries operate (b6) is 
significantly different from zero at a 10 per cent level or better except for the year 1996. 
Simulations show that the estimated b-values imply that marginal costs increase slightly 
concavely according to trip length (  0/)( ,0/)( 22
1
2
2
1
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due to the distance independent costs elements related to turn – arounds being distributed 
on more km. Similar results are found in Jørgensen et al. (2004). 
 
 (Insert Table 4 about here)  
 
Most interesting is, however, that the estimated value of the parameter which indicates 
whether OVDS has reported too high costs to the authorities or not (b5), generally supports 
our a priori assumptions; its estimated value is positive for all years between 1996 and 2000 
and significant at a 10 per cent level or better.11 The value of b5 varies from 0.13 in 1998 to 
0.25 in 1997 with an average of 0.19 between 1996 and 2000. This means that the reported 
costs for these six services run by OVDS were on average about 19 per cent higher (100b5 
denotes percentage difference) compared to the reported costs for comparable services run 
by other operators. After the fraud was detected, that is for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005; 
Table 4 shows that b5 ≈ 0 implying that the reported costs for the OVDS services 
corresponded to the reported costs for similar services run by other companies. 
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It is expected that b5 > 0 before 2001 since OVDS officially admitted having conducted fraud. 
One central question is, of course, whether all OVDS’ higher reported costs related to the b5 
parameters for the period 1996-2000 are purely fraud-connected. The higher reported costs 
in this period could also be due to the company working under harder external conditions or 
being run less efficiently than other Norwegian ferry companies.  
  
When it comes to external working conditions, it should be noted that the Norwegian ferry 
industry is strictly regulated by the authorities with respect to safety and service on different 
ferries. There are also national standards regarding the necessary number of crewmen 
onboard. Moreover, there are no indications that prices of input factors are unevenly 
distributed throughout the country; the prices of important inputs such as salary and fuel are, 
for example, the same all over the country. This indicates limited variations in salaries and 
fuel in total amounting to about 60 per cent of total ferry costs (depreciation included). 
Summing up, neither of these factors point in the direction of higher reported costs in OVDS 
due to the company running under different working conditions than other Norwegian ferry 
operators.  
 
Several factors also indicate that the internal efficiency of OVDS is not substantially different 
from other ferry operators. Firstly, national staff qualification requirements ensure that the 
crewmen are equally skilled in all companies. Secondly, available figures from 1995 and 
2003 indicate that the development in the ferries’ load factor, defined as the number of PCE-
km (Xi1Xi2) over the number of sailed PCE-km, has been approximately the same for OVDS 
as for other ferry companies. Consequently, the development in ferry capacity utilization 
when sailing, should not cause any significant improvement in OVDS’s efficiency compared 
to other ferry operators. Finally, as commented on later, the dummy variable (b5) does not 
show any significant time pattern from 1996 to 2000. Hence, if the change in b5 from the 
period 1996-2000 to the period 2003-2005 was due to improved internal efficiency, the 
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company must have achieved productivity improvements of about 19 per cent compared to 
other ferry operators during the period 2000 - 2003. The reported costs of running OVDS’s 
services after 2002 correlated namely well with the costs of running comparable services in 
other companies (b5 ≈ 0). Such a productivity improvement in OVDS seems very unlikely. In 
fact the negative media focus and attention related to the lawsuit created a lot of anxiety 
amongst company employees. This would be more likely to demoralise them than boost their 
efficiency considerably.  
 
Summing up, even though this cannot be unambiguously concluded, the arguments support 
the interpretation that the higher costs indicated by the OVDS dummy variable manifest fraud 
(overstated costs) during the time period 1996-2000. This means that the estimated values of 
100b5t (t = 1996 – 2000) show OVDS’s actual overstating of costs in year t, measured in per 
cent. Some variation in b5 does show between 1996 and 2000, but the estimated value of b5 
only deviates in the year 1998 from the mean for all years using a significance level of 10 per 
cent or better. Hence, we cannot conclude at a reasonable level of significance that OVDS’s 
overstating of costs is different for the years 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000.  
 
Based on the above reasoning, the magnitudes of the overstated costs in year t for all the 6 
OVDS services included in our data set (OCt) can be estimated using the following formula:  
 
(4)  
t
tt
t b
bC
OC
5
5
1
   
 
in which Ct represents total reported ferry costs for the 6 services from OVDS to the 
authorities.12 As Table 5 shows, the total overstatement of costs from OVDS for these 6 
services in question, measured in 2006 prices, varies from 14.6 million NOK in 1998 to 25.4 
NOK million in 1997. Over this five year period (1996-2000) total overstatement, thus, 
amounts to over 103 million NOK, measured in 2006 prices. Additionally, using the estimated 
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standard deviations of b5 and the relationship between OCt and b5 in (4), 90 per cent 
confidence intervals of b5 and OCt are given in Table 5. The lowest values of the confidence 
intervals of b5 and OCt are positive for all years except 1998 where the significance of b5 is 
low. As an approximation, the confidence interval of OCt derives a 90 per cent probability that 
the annual overstatement of costs lies between 4 million NOK and 35 million NOK for the 
years 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000.   
 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
 
4. COMPARING THE MODEL RESULTS WITH THE COURT’S VERDICT 
Since the revenue models did not provide significant values of the parameter indicating 
whether or not OVDS has understated revenues (a3p and a3v) for any year, we have 
disregarded their estimated values in Table 6. 
  
As previously emphasized, the verdict provides no information about whether OVDS’s 
defraud attempt was linked to particular services or not. In the following calculations, we 
therefore assume that OVDS overstated the costs for the other ferry services with the same 
percentage as for those included in our data set. Furthermore, the total reported costs of 
running all the 12 OVDS’s services are estimated to be about 60 per cent higher for every 
year than for those services included in the data set.13 It follows then that OVDS’s total 
overstatement of costs, TOCt, for every year t in Table 6 can be found by multiplying the 
figures in Table 5 by 1.60. 
 
Table 6 shows, that our model estimations indicate far higher figures of overstated costs for 
all years than the Court did. Except for the year 1998, we can conclude that the Court’s 
verdict gives too low subsidy fraud amounts at 7 per cent significant level or better. The 
overstatement of costs during the period 1995-2000 amounts to 165 million NOK. These 
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estimations are over 3 times as high as the Court’s estimates. A closer look at the figures in 
Table 6 shows that the annual correlation between the magnitudes of the Court’s and the 
model’s estimates of cost overstatement are low; relatively speaking the differences in these 
estimates are highest for the years 1996 and 1997. 
 
(Insert Table 6 about here)  
 
The critical question is, of course, whether OVDS overstated the costs for the other ferry 
services with about the same percentage as for those included in our data set. We find no 
reason to believe that OVDS’s reporting procedures have differed to any great extent for 
these two groups of ferry services. If so, the Court has greatly underestimated the 
magnitudes of OVDS’s cost manipulations. In this respect, it is worth noting that, according to 
accepted juridical and accounting principles, the defendant can only be found guilty for 
amounts which the Court can prove without doubt. This suggests lower estimates than we 
have found. 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The aim of this article is to demonstrate how the use of standardized revenue- and cost norm 
models based on the transport operators’ reported accountant figures to the authorities can 
be used to reveal inaccurate information from the transport operators. The article uses the 
accusation against one of the biggest Norwegian ferry company (OVDS) as a starting point. 
OVDS was accused of intentionally having understated revenues and exaggerated costs 
during the period 1992-2001, in this way attempting to swindle the state for 113 million NOK 
or 139 million NOK in 2006 prices. The Court concluded that OVDS’s overstatement of 
subsidy needs has probably resulted in granting the company about 63 million NOK too 
much in subsidies (about 75 million NOK in 2006 prices) up to 2002. When the Court 
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proceedings finished in 2004, the verdict concluded that OVDS should pay back 72 million 
NOK and five of the top managers were in addition given prison sentences. 
 
Our analysis shows no indications that OVDS had understated revenues for any year 
between 1996 and 2000, whilst the Court concluded that such offences had also taken place 
for the years 1997 and 1998. Hence, as far as manipulation of revenue figures is concerned, 
our results conflict with the Court’s verdict for these two years. The planned introduction of 
electronic tickets (AUTOPASS) on the Norwegian ferries will report the traffic figures 
automatically and can be a means to meet possible fraudulent accounting of revenues.   
 
According to our model, OVDS’s reported costs during the period 1996 – 2000 were between 
13 per cent and 25 per cent higher than for comparable services in other ferry companies. 
After the company was suspected for subsidy fraud in 2002, its reported costs were, 
however, the same as for other ferry companies. Higher reported costs during 1996 – 2000 
could be due to overstatement of costs, harder working conditions or company specific 
inefficiency. Even though there is strong evidence to support the arguments that both 
external working conditions and internal efficiency have been similar for OVDS and other 
ferry companies, it is impossible to conclude unambiguously that all costs indicated by the 
OVDS dummy variable from 1996 to 2000 are due to fraud. Taking all the arguments above 
into account, our analysis supports the verdict reached that such offences have indeed taken 
place during the period 1996-2000. 
 
If we accept that OVDS’s higher reported costs are due to fraud and that OVDS also used 
the same reporting procedures for the services not included in our data set, the company 
attempted to swindle the state for about 165 million NOK in 2006 prices during the five year 
period from 1996 to 2000. Even though our model acquits OVDS for revenue 
understatement, the magnitude of the swindle attempt in our model is over 3 times higher 
than the conclusions given in the court verdict.  
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It is also important to note that we only compare the court’s conclusions with revenue- and 
cost models for the five year period 1996 – 2000. According to the verdict, the subsidy fraud 
attempted in this period accounts for only about 38 per cent of the total fraud attempt. 
Bearing this and the results in Table 6 in mind, this indicates that the subsidy amount actually 
received illegally by OVDS far exceeded the sum of 63 million NOK estimated by the Court.   
 
Summing up, if the authorities had used a similar cost model presented in this article when 
negotiating with the ferry companies, the partners would have had less asymmetric 
information about the cost structure in the ferry industry, and the authorities would most likely 
have been able to reveal OVDS’s fraud attempt at an earlier stage. Moreover, when the ferry 
operators know that their negotiators use such models, they are less likely to manipulate the 
accounts. In this way, such models have a significant deterrent effect. 
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NOTES   
1. This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the European Transport 
Conference 2007. 
2. Author for correspondence: Tel. +47 75 51 76 84, Email: finn.jorgensen@nord.no.   
3. Before 1981 the county authorities balanced the bus- and fast craft operators’ accounts 
and before 1990 DR balanced the ferry operators’ accounts. Such payment procedures gave 
the operators few incentives to run their business efficiently. 
4. Suppose P, F and EF = P·F denote the probability of being detected, the level of fine and 
expected fine, respectively. For a risk neutral operator the deterrent effect can be measured 
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by the expected penalty alone, see for example Polinsky and Shavell (2007). It follows that 
0  )/(  FPEF  and 0  )/(  PFEF . P and F are thus complementary deterrent 
means; the higher the value of one of them, the more deterrent effect has a change in the 
other one. 
5. 1€ ≈ 9 NOK  
6. The verdict does not specify the details behind the calculation of 69.6 per cent, but argues 
that it is a well founded approximation of the misreported accounting figures influence on 
subsidies because it is based on extensive studies of costs and revenues in combination with 
statements from witnesses.   
7. A detailed description of the PCE production measure is given in Solvoll (1997). 
8. The Court did not specify whether OVDS underreported revenues from passenger 
transport or from vehicle transport. 
9. For discussions of cost functions in transport, see for example Braeutigam (1999), Pels 
and Rietveld (2000) and Hensher and Brewer (2001).  
10. We possess no available data before 1996 and for the years 2001 and 2002.  
11. Note that the significance for b5 is given according to the assumption in section 3.2 using 
a one-sided test for the years 1996-2000 and a two-sided test for the years 2003-2005. 
12. Let *tC be the true costs for OVDS in year t. This implies that 
*
5 )1( ttt CbC  such that 
)1(
)(
5
5*
t
tt
ttt b
bC
CCOC  .  
13. This means that the reported costs of running the 6 ferry services included in our data set 
account for about 60 per cent of OVDS’s total reported ferry costs. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for all services in the data set for the years 1995-2005. Costs 
and revenues are reported in 2006 prices.  
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 2004 2005
No. Observations, N 67 67 66 61 57 57 58 51 
Revenue, Rip, 
1 000 NOK 
Mean 3 470 3 426 3 694 3 623 3 853 3 765 3 443 3 612
Std. dev. 3 295 3 383 3 642 4 308 4 482 4 371 3 722 4 076
Revenue, Riv,  
1 000 NOK 
Mean 11 200 11 500 12 000 11 500 11 900 13 800 14 600 14 500
Std. dev 13 200 13 800 14 900 14 900 15 600 18 700 19 900 18 800
Costs, Ci, 
1 000 NOK 
Mean 18 600 18 800 19 200 18 900 21 800 25 400 26 400 29 100
Std. dev. 14 400 14 900 14 900 15 500 18 500 22 000 22 100 25 200
PCE 
Transported, 
Xi1 in 1 000  
Mean 213 226 236 216 221 273 296 325 
Std. dev. 210 223 236 218 227 298 317 346 
Passengers 
Transported,  
Pi in 1 000 
Mean 204 209 209 194 204 219 231 243 
Std. dev. 201 210 202 192 203 224 233 251 
Distance of 
service,  
Xi2 in km 
Mean 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.9 8.1 7.3 7.2 7.1 
Std. dev. 7.9 7.9 8 8.1 8.3 7.4 7.3 7.6 
OVDS  
services 
Di1=1 
or not Di1=0   
Mean 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12 
Std. dev. 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.33 
Unsheltered 
stretches 
Di2=1 or not 
Di2=0 
Mean 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.18 
Std. dev. 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.39 
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Table 2. Estimation results of the passenger revenue model for every year – t-values in 
parentheses. 
Year a0p a1p a2p a3p Adj. R2 F-value 
1996 107 210 (0.76) 
10.88 
(16.30) 
0.85
(15.98)
212 880
(0.71) 0.958 469 
1997 38 807 (0.28) 
11.48 
(17.80) 
0.80
(15.20)
20 964
(0.07) 0.960 491 
1998 2 366 (0.02) 
13.11 
(19.37) 
0.75
(14.00)
-1 500
(-0.00) 0.963 521 
1999 -69 475 (-0.50) 
12.06 
(17.56) 
0.98
(19.17)
-313 093
(-0.95) 0.979 732 
2000 -89 365 (-0.47) 
13.48 
(15.47) 
0.73
(12.05)
132 823
(0.31) 0.968 421 
2003 -114 211 (1.08) 
14.77 
(31.47) 
0.51
(15.86)
-282 262
(-1.29) 0.988 1 355 
2004 31 760 (0.29) 
12.67 
(26.42) 
0.56
(18.29)
237 247
(1.10) 0.984 1 006 
2005 -21 025 (-0.17) 
13.39 
(26.12) 
0.50
(15.90)
111 456
(0.48) 0.985 949 
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Table 3. Estimation results of the vehicle revenue model for every year – t-values in 
parentheses. 
Year a0v a1v a2v a3v Adj. R2 F-value 
1996 -29 914 (-0.08) 
27.07 
(17.58) 
3.36
(26.56)
727 880
(0.91) 0.981 1 107 
1997 -32 350 (-0.10) 
26.86 
(19.34) 
3.31
(28.87)
1 009 811
(1.30) 0.984 1 308 
1998 -187 773 (-0.51) 
28.50 
(19.47) 
3.21
(26.75)
526 778
(0.62) 0.984 1 235 
1999 -500 581 (-1.36) 
34.74 
(20.67) 
2.73
(22.03)
-199 206
(-0.25) 0.985 1 227 
2000 -284 525 (-0.64) 
31.35 
(15.97) 
3.03
(20.68)
-309 639
(-0.33) 0.982 928 
2003 -254 083  (-0.56) 
31.92 
(20.32) 
2.60
(23.20)
50 640
(0.05) 0.986 1 266 
2004 -908 040 (-1.37) 
33.73 
(16.25) 
2.57
(16.31)
722 562
(0.48) 0.972 651 
2005 -153 678 (-0.25) 
29.76 
(15.95) 
2.60
(20.33)
505 470
(0.40) 0.978 731 
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Table 4. Estimation results of the cost model for every year – t-values in parentheses.a 
Year b0 b1 b2 b4 b5 b6 Adj. R2 F-value 
1996 16.389 (491.76) 
0.154 
(3.86) 
0.354
(11.75)
0.052
(5.07)
0.177
(2.03)
0.107
(1.60) 0.893 111 
1997 16.385 (484.63) 
0.170 
(4.17) 
0.332
(10.54)
0.064
(6.18)
0.252
(2.83)
0.148
(2.15) 0.886 103 
1998 16.428 (432.87) 
0.192 
(4.28) 
0.309
(8.84)
0.060
(5.28)
0.131
(1.33)
0.153
(2.03) 0.863 83 
1999 16.391 (438.04) 
0.237 
(5.40) 
0.280
(7.83)
0.064
(5.84)
0.193
(2.14)
0.124
(1.74) 0.888 96 
2000 16.485 (434.20) 
0.210 
(4.56) 
0.320
(8.59)
0.060
(5.33)
0.186
(2.10)
0.167
(2.25) 0.904 107 
2003 16.657 (399.31) 
0.174 
(3.39) 
0.331
(8.30)
0.055
(5.05)
0.007
(0.06)
0.257
(2.90) 0.873 78 
2004 16.695 (378.15 
0.167 
(3.06) 
0.330
(7.69)
0.057
(4.80)
0.057
(0.51)
0.253
(2.67) 0.854 67 
2005 16.779 (343.62) 
0.116 
(1.88) 
0.409
(8.20)
0.034
(2.60)
-0.008
(-0.07)
0.345
(3.43) 0.890 82 
a The second order explanatory variable 211 )(ln iX , and thereby the estimation of b3 in (3), is 
omitted. 
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Table 5. Overstated costs from OVDS during the period 1996-2000 for the 6 services in our 
data set in 2006 prices. 90 per cent confidence interval.  
Year 
Percentage overstating 
of costs (100b5) Overstated costs, (1000 NOK) 
Low Expected High Low Expected High 
1996 3.2 17.7 32.3 3 799 18 650 30 252 
1997 10.3 25.2 40.2 11 814 25 449 36 182 
1998 -3.3 13.1 29.6 -4 370 14 629 28 800 
1999 4.2 19.3 34.4 5 296 21 089 33 339 
2000 3.8 18.6 33.3 5 444 23 510 37 568 
Average 3.6 18.8 33.9 4 397 20 665 33 228 
Total – – – 21 983 103 327 166 141 
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Table 6. Model results compared with the verdict for the years 1996-2000 in 2006 prices. 
Year 
Understated revenues,  
1 000 NOK 
Overstated costs,  
1 000 NOK 
Overstated subsidy needs, 
1 000 NOK Significant level of 
difference a Model results The verdict Model results, TOCt The verdict Model results The verdict 
1996 
No 
indications of 
understated 
revenues 
0 29 840 8 622 29 840 8 622 6 % 
1997 96 40 669 8 312 40 669 8 408 1 % 
1998 663 23 384 7 673 23 384 8 336 19 % 
1999 0 33 731 11 999 33 731 11 999 7 % 
2000 0 37 696 12 476 37 696 12 476 7 % 
1996- 
2000 – 759 165 320 49 082 165 320 49 841 – 
a Significant level of difference between overstated subsidy needs from the model and the verdict. 1-
tailed test.  
